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This article examines the legal regulation and enforcement of asymmetric choice of court 
agreements under the Brussels I Regulation (Recast). The two significant and related issues 
of the effectiveness of asymmetric jurisdiction agreements under Article 25 of the Recast 
Regulation and whether proceedings commenced in the primary non-exclusive court 
identified in the agreement should trigger the application of Article 31(2) of the Recast 
Regulation are analyzed. Notwithstanding, the rulings of the French Cour de Cassation in 
Rothschild and ICH v Credit Suisse, it will be argued that asymmetric choice of court 
agreements should in principle be effective under Article 25 of the Recast Regulation from 
the perspectives of validity, certainty, form and fairness. The validity and effectiveness of 
asymmetric jurisdiction agreements in the jurisprudence of the English courts is already well 
established. There also exists some support for the argument that proceedings initiated in 
the English courts (as the primary non-exclusive court identified in the clause) may invoke 
the protective cover of Article 31(2) of the Recast Regulation where the borrower in an 
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The Legal Regulation and Enforcement of Asymmetric Jurisdiction Agreements in the 
European Union 
Introduction 
This article examines the legal regulation and enforcement of asymmetric choice of court 
agreements under the Brussels I Regulation (Recast) [or ‘Recast Regulation’].1 The two 
significant and related issues of the effectiveness of asymmetric jurisdiction agreements 
under Article 25 of the Recast Regulation and whether proceedings commenced in the 
primary non-exclusive court identified in the agreement should trigger the application of 
Article 31(2) of the Recast Regulation are analyzed. It will be argued that asymmetric choice 
of court agreements should in principle be effective under Article 25 of the Recast 
Regulation from the perspectives of validity, certainty, form and fairness. The validity and 
effectiveness of asymmetric jurisdiction agreements in the jurisprudence of the English 
courts is already well established. There also exists some support for the argument that 
proceedings initiated in the English courts (as the primary non-exclusive court identified in 
the clause) may invoke the protective cover of Article 31(2) of the Recast Regulation where 
the borrower in an international finance agreement has breached his obligation to sue 
exclusively in the English courts.  
After considering the preliminary issue of characterization of jurisdiction agreements as 
exclusive or non-exclusive, we will proceed to assess the validity and effectiveness of 
asymmetric jurisdiction agreements under Article 25 of the Recast Regulation, Article 23 of 
the Brussels I Regulation2 and under national law.3 This will be followed by an analysis of 
whether Article 31(2) of the Recast Regulation may under the guise of interpretation be 
extended to provide protective cover for English asymmetric choice of court agreements. 
The conclusion will draw upon the differing attitudes of the French courts and the English 
courts on the issue of the validity of such clauses. It will be argued that a solution focused 
on enforcing the rights and obligations of the parties to the asymmetric jurisdiction 
agreement is arguably defensible from the perspective of business efficacy,4 lowering the 
opportunity cost associated with entering into the transaction for both the borrower and 
                                                          
1 See Articles 25 and 31(2)-(3) of the Council Regulation (EU) 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and 
commercial matters (recast) [2012] OJ L351/1. In accordance with Article 81 of the Brussels I Regulation 
(Recast), the Regulation applies as of 10 January 2015 to legal proceedings instituted (and to judgments 
rendered) on or after that date.   
2 Council Regulation (EC) 44/2001 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil 
and commercial matters (Brussels I) [2001] OJ L12/1. (‘Brussels I Regulation’) 
3 Article 25(1) of the Recast Regulation has widened the scope of the legal regulation of jurisdiction 
agreements in the EU as the provision applies even if both parties to the agreement are non EU domicillaries. 
Now both the prorogative and derogative effect of such agreements are governed by the Recast Regulation in 
contrast to Article 23(3) of the Brussels I Regulation which only regulated the derogative effect of jurisdiction 
agreements concluded by non EU domicillaries. As a result, the common law jurisdictional regime has become 
increasingly less relevant. See Q Forner-Delaygua, Changes to jurisdiction based on exclusive jurisdiction 
agreements under the Brussels I Regulation Recast, 11 Journal of Private International Law 379, 381 (2015).    
4 See R Fentiman, Unilateral Jurisdiction Agreements in Europe, 72 Cambridge Law Journal 24, 24 (2013). 




the lender5 and minimizing the enforcement risk for the lender in an international finance 
agreement.6 One way jurisdiction clauses have become the market standard in finance and 
aviation agreements, and are included in the Loan Market Association’s (‘LMA’) 
recommended form of facility documentation.7      
Characterization of a Choice of Court Agreement as Exclusive or Non-exclusive 
In practice the most significant distinction to be drawn when considering the nature of a 
choice of court agreement is whether the agreement is properly to be classified as exclusive 
or non-exclusive. Briggs has suggested that it might be useful to cast aside what he terms a 
‘binary distinction’ and ‘the unhelpful terminology of non-exclusive jurisdiction agreements’ 
by recalibrating the focus instead on construing what obligations the parties wished to 
create and impose on one another.8  
However, as a matter of logic, it is important that the courts treat disputes subject to non-
exclusive jurisdiction clauses as being different from disputes subject to exclusive 
jurisdiction clauses. The idea of a unified category for both types of choice of court 
agreements is not without doubt as it all too easily blurs into relative insignificance the 
existing boundary in theory and practice between exclusive and non-exclusive jurisdiction 
agreements.9 In practice, the categories exclusive and non-exclusive jurisdiction agreement 
and the distinction between them are of central importance to the application of Article 25 
of the Recast Regulation.10 The distinction retains its importance in relation to the Hague 
Convention on Choice of Court Agreements (‘Hague Convention’) which excludes non-
exclusive choice of court agreements from the scope of the Convention.11 Recital 22 and 
                                                          
5 In terms of favourable interest rates which lower the transaction cost. 
6 See FN 23 below for a definition of ‘enforcement risk’. 
7 N Beale and C Clayson, One-way jurisdiction clauses: a one-way ticket to anywhere?, 28 Journal of 
International Banking Law and Regulation 463, 464 (2013). 
8 A Briggs, Agreements on Jurisdiction and Choice of Law, 110-121, 120 (OUP 2008); A Briggs, The Subtle Variety 
of Jurisdiction Agreements, Lloyd’s Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly 364, 375-376 [2012]; A Briggs, 
Private International Law in English Courts, 398 (OUP 2014); TM Yeo, The Contractual Basis of the Enforcement 
of Exclusive and Non-Exclusive Choice of Court Agreements, 17 Singapore Academy of Law Journal 306, 351 
(2005); See L Collins et al. (eds.), Dicey, Morris and Collins on the Conflict of Laws, Chapter 12, 603 (15th Edition, 
Sweet and Maxwell 2012). 
9 See CJS Knight, Anti-suit Injunctions and Non-exclusive Jurisdiction Clauses, 69 Cambridge Law Journal 25, 26 
(2010); D Joseph QC, Jurisdiction and Arbitration Agreements and their Enforcement, 102-105 (2nd Edition, 
Sweet and Maxwell 2010).  
10 Article 25(1) of the Recast Regulation and Article 23(1) of the Brussels I Regulation create a presumption of 
exclusivity by providing that: ‘Such jurisdiction shall be exclusive unless the parties have agreed otherwise.’; 
See PR Beaumont and PE McEleavy, Anton’s Private International Law, 241 (SULI, 3rd Edition, W Green 2011); T 
Kruger, Civil Jurisdiction Rules of the EU and their Impact on Third States, 226 (OUP 2008). 
11 See Article 1(1) and Articles 3(a)-3(b) of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements in Permanent 
Bureau of the Conference, Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice of Court Agreements: Text and Explanatory 
Report by Trevor Hartley and Masato Dogauchi, http://www.hcch.net/upload/expl37final.pdf (accessed 1 
January 2014); On 1 October 2015, the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements entered into force in 
28 Contracting States (Mexico and all the Member States of the EU, except Denmark). The Civil Jurisdiction and 
Judgments (Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements 2005) Regulations 2015, SI 2015/1644, have 
brought the Hague Convention into force in the UK. 




Article 31(2) of the Recast Regulation also rely on the distinction and a literal reading of the 
provision and the recital limits the reverse lis pendens rule to exclusive choice of court 
agreements.12 Similarly, the distinction between the two types of agreement is of 
significance in relation to the enforcement of the jurisdiction agreements by the courts, 
including enforcement by way of a claim for damages for breach of contract.13 
It is significant to note that the notion of breach of a choice of court agreement is 
predominantly relevant in relation to exclusive jurisdiction agreements, because non-
exclusive jurisdiction agreements by their very nature do not lend themselves towards the 
finding of an inter partes obligation not to sue in a non-elected forum.14 Non-exclusive 
jurisdiction agreements may attribute jurisdiction to a court which would otherwise not be 
competent. Thus, they have the effect of widening the range of courts that can potentially 
be seised by the parties.15 
The characterization of a jurisdiction agreement as exclusive or non-exclusive has now 
become more significant in the European Union (‘EU’) with the Hague Convention coming 
into effect, because the classification determines which regime (Recast Regulation or Hague 
Convention) must be applied by a Member State court. The objective of the Hague 
                                                          
12 See U Magnus, Gerichtsstandsvereinbarungen unter der reformierten EuGVO in N Witzleb, R Ellger, P 
Mankowski, H Merkt and O Remien (eds.), Festschrift für Dieter Martiny zum 70. Geburtstag 797, 799 
(Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck 2014); P Neilson, The New Brussels I Regulation, 50 Common Market Law Review 
503, 521 (2013). 
13 See Donohue v Armco Inc. [2001] UKHL 64; [2002] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 425, [24] (Lord Bingham of Cornhill) and 
[45] (Lord Hobhouse of Woodborough) (Lord Bingham at [24]: ‘the general rule is clear: where parties have 
bound themselves by an exclusive jurisdiction clause effect should ordinarily be given to that obligation in the 
absence of strong reasons for departing from it’); Continental Bank NA v Aeakos Compania Naviera SA [1994] 1 
WLR 588, 598 (CA) (Steyn LJ) (delivering the judgment of the Court of Appeal) (an anti-suit injunction case, 
referring to the injunction defendant’s ‘clear breach of contract’); For the development of the damages 
remedy for breach of exclusive jurisdiction agreements by the English courts, see, Union Discount Co Ltd v 
Zoller and Others [2001] EWCA Civ 1755, [2002] 1 WLR 1517 (Schiemann LJ); Donohue v Armco Inc [2001] UKHL 
64, [2002] 1 All ER 749, [36] (Lord Bingham of Cornhill) and [48] (Lord Hobhouse of Woodborough); A/S D/S 
Svendborg v Akar [2003] EWHC 797 (Comm) (Julian Flaux QC J); National Westminster Bank plc v Rabobank 
Nederland (No 3) [2007] EWHC 3163 (Comm), [2008] 1 All ER (Comm) 266 (Sir Anthony Colman J). 
14 J Fawcett, Non exclusive jurisdiction agreements in private international law, Lloyd’s Maritime and 
Commercial Law Quarterly 234, 253 [2001]; T Raphael, The Anti-Suit Injunction, Chapter 9, 223 (OUP 2008); L 
Merrett, The Enforcement of Jurisdiction Agreements within the Brussels Regime, 55 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 315, 316 (2006); J Steinle and E Vasiliades, The Enforcement of Jurisdiction 
Agreements under the Brussels I Regulation: Reconsidering the Principle of Party Autonomy, 6 Journal of 
Private International Law 565, 577 (2010); K Takahashi, Damages for Breach of a Choice of Court Agreement, 
10 Yearbook of Private International Law 57, 59 (2008); D Tan, Damages for Breach of Forum Selection Clauses, 
Principled Remedies, and Control of International Civil Litigation, 40 Texas International Law Journal 623, 627 
(2005); R Butler and B Weijburg, Do Anti-Suit Injunctions Still Have a Role to Play?: An English Law Perspective, 
24 University of San Francisco Maritime Law Journal 257, 277-279 (2011-2012); cf Sabah Shipyard (Pakistan) 
Ltd v Islamic Republic of Pakistan [2003] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 571, [36]-[37] (Waller LJ) has reduced the importance of 
the distinction between exclusive and non-exclusive jurisdiction agreements. The Court of Appeal decided that 
it is a breach of contract to act in a manner so as to prevent a party from bringing proceedings in the non-
exclusive forum; TM Yeo, Breach of Agreements on Choice of Law, Lloyd’s Maritime and Commercial Law 
Quarterly 194, 195-196 [2010].   
15 Raphael, supra, Chapter 9, 223; Merrett, The Enforcement of Jurisdiction Agreements within the Brussels 
Regime, supra, 316; Steinle and Vasiliades, supra, 577; Takahashi, supra, 59.   




Convention is to regulate the enforcement of choice of court agreements and resulting 
judgments globally and it only applies to exclusive choice of court agreements.16 It was 
inspired by and seeks to emulate the success of the United Nations Convention on the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 1958.17 Following the approach of 
the New York Convention, the Hague Convention requires the strict enforcement of 
exclusive jurisdiction agreements.18  
Effectiveness of Asymmetric Jurisdiction Agreements and the French Cour de Cassation’s 
Recent Decisions 
A choice of court agreement may be bilateral and exclusive, allowing each party to sue the 
other in the same court or courts of a Member State, or asymmetric, whereby one party 
alone submits to the agreed Member State court’s jurisdiction and the other party has a 
wider choice of forum.19 Asymmetric or unilateral choice of court agreements are very 
common in cross border finance transactions, where the rights of one party to a jurisdiction 
agreement are at least partly unilateral. For instance, a borrower and lender in an 
international loan agreement will submit to the exclusive jurisdiction of a designated court, 
but the lender will reserve the right to sue the borrower in any other court of competent 
jurisdiction.20 The jurisdiction of any alternative court depends on whether that court has 
personal or subject matter jurisdiction and not on consent.21 Where the counterparty’s 
obligation is the repayment of a debt, such clauses are less a mechanism for resolving 
disputes, and more an avenue for facilitating the enforcement of the debt. 
The lender may rely on a summary enforcement procedure available under national law to 
recover the debt in any alternative court.22 A unilateral jurisdiction agreement allows a 
creditor the flexibility to seek enforcement wherever a borrower’s assets are for the time 
being located.23 By minimizing enforcement risk they reduce the cost of the transaction to 
borrowers and enhance the readiness of lenders to provide finance. Asymmetric clauses are 
                                                          
16 See generally, P Beaumont, Hague Choice of Court Agreements Convention 2005: Background, Negotiations, 
Analysis and Current Status, 5 Journal of Private International Law 125, 134 (2009). 
17 The United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 10 June, 
1958, 330 UNTS 4739. (‘New York Convention’) 
18 See Articles 5 and 6 of the Hague Convention. 
19 See TC Hartley, International Commercial Litigation, 164 (CUP 2009); ZS Tang, Jurisdiction and Arbitration 
Agreements in International Commercial Law, 10-12 (Routledge 2014); R Fentiman, International Commercial 
Litigation, 79-88 (2nd Edition, OUP 2015). 
20 See BNP Paribas SA v Anchorage Capital Europe LLP & ors [2013] EWHC 3073 (Comm), [91]-[93], where 
Males J on a proper construction of the non-exclusive jurisdiction agreement, granted an anti-suit injunction to 
enforce the defendant’s contractual obligation to sue exclusively in the English courts. 
21 Under the EU private international law regime, other courts of competent jurisdiction will be determined by 
the rules on jurisdiction in Chapter II of the Brussels I Regulation and the Brussels I Regulation (Recast). 
22 In the English law of civil procedure an action in debt enjoys the advantage of the ability to obtain a 
summary judgment under Part 24 of the Civil Procedure Rules. 
23 ‘Enforcement risk is the risk that a judgment-debtor with worldwide assets will disperse or conceal those 
assets……….’ and ‘The extent of such risk depends on the effectiveness of jurisdiction agreements’: Fentiman, 
International Commercial Litigation, supra, 6. 




valid and enforceable in English law and have been upheld without challenge or reservation 
in a number of English decisions.24 However, the validity and enforcement of such 
asymmetric provisions within the EU regime, and in many national legal systems, is 
uncertain.25 
Doubt has arisen in particular because of the controversial decision of the French Cour de 
Cassation in Ms X v Banque Privee Edmond de Rothschild Europe (Societe) (‘Rothschild’).26 In 
Rothschild, Ms X, a French national, commenced proceedings in Paris against Banque 
Rothschild, a Luxembourg bank with which she had an account. The contract between them 
provided that the Luxembourg courts should have exclusive jurisdiction over any claims 
brought by Ms X, but permitted the bank to sue either in Luxembourg or in the courts of the 
client’s domicile or any other court of competent jurisdiction. Relying on the first limb of the 
clause, the bank argued that the French courts had no jurisdiction. Agreeing with the courts 
below, however, the Cour de Cassation held that Ms X was free to sue in France. The French 
Supreme Court held that, the jurisdiction agreement, purporting to confine her to suing in 
Luxembourg, was ineffective. Deploying a principle familiar in French contract law, the court 
held that the clause was potestative,27 as it merely granted an option to the bank to sue in 
                                                          
24 See Continental Bank NA v Aeakos Compania Naviera SA [1994] 1 WLR 588 (CA) (Steyn LJ); Mauritius 
Commercial Bank Limited v Hestia Holdings Limited and Sujana Universal Industries Limited [2013] EWHC 1328 
(Comm) (Popplewell J); Ocarina Marine Ltd v Marcard Stein & Co [1994] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 524; Credit Suisse First 
Boston (Europe) Ltd v MLC (Bermuda) Ltd [1999] CLC 579; UBS AG and UBS Securities LLC v HSN Nordbank AG 
[2008] EWHC 1529 (Comm); In Lornamead Acquistions Limited v Kapthing Bank HF [2011] EWHC 2611 (Comm) 
a clause providing that the jurisdiction clause was for the benefit of one party was considered valid; In Law 
Debenture Trust Corporation Plc v Elektrim Finance BV [2005] EWHC 1412 (Ch), [2005] 2 All ER 476, an 
arbitration agreement with option for one party to litigate was approved; In Three Shipping Ltd v Harebell 
Shipping Ltd [2004] EWHC 2001 (Comm) a jurisdiction agreement coupled with a unilateral option to arbitrate 
was approved; See also, M Keyes and BA Marshall, Jurisdiction Agreements: Exclusive, Optional and 
Asymmetrical, 11 Journal of Private International Law 345, 373-377 (2015); Beale and Clayson, supra, 463. 
25 On 2 September 2011 (Judgment No. 71 in commercial case No. 1193/2010) the Bulgarian Supreme Court of 
Cassation (Commercial Chamber) struck down a one way arbitration/choice of court clause in a loan 
agreement and declared it void. The Russian Supreme Arbitrazh Court reached a similar conclusion concerning 
one way arbitration agreements on 2 September 2012 in Russian Telephonic Company v Sony-Ericsson Mobile 
Communications (Case No 1831/12). 
26 Ms X v Banque Privee Edmond de Rothschild Europe (Societe) Cass civ, 1ere, 26.9.2012, No 11-26.022, [2013] 
ILPr 12; See M Ancel, L Marion and L Wynaendts, Réflexions sur les Clauses de Juridiction Asymétriques, Nº 148 
Banque & Droit, 3, mars-avril 2013; R Hausmann, Invalidity of Unilateral Jurisdiction Clauses under Article 23 
Brussels I Regulation?, 13 The European Legal Forum 37, 41-43 (2013); A Briggs, One Sided Jurisdiction Clauses: 
French Folly and Russian Menace, Lloyd’s Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly 137 [2013]; Fentiman, 
Unilateral Jurisdiction Agreements in Europe, supra; Briggs, Private International Law in English Courts, supra, 
245; Keyes and Marshall, Jurisdiction Agreements, supra, 366-372; G Cuniberti, French Supreme Court Strikes 
Down One Way Jurisdiction Clause, http://conflictoflaws.net/2012/french-supreme-court-strikes-down-one-
way-jurisdiction-clause/ (accessed 21 April 2014); Garcimartin, Chapter 9 – Prorogation of Jurisdiction, infra, 
302, notes that the French Cour de Cassation decision has ‘incorrectly’ ruled against the validity of unilateral 
jurisdiction clauses. 
27 Potestatif: Depends on the will of one of the parties; See ‘potestatif’ in Harrap’s Dictionnaire Juridique 
(Dalloz, Chambers Harrap Publishers Ltd 2004); ‘Potestative condition’: a condition or term of a legal 
agreement that is completely within the power and control of one of the parties and that makes the 
agreement unenforceable for lack of mutuality of obligation; See Merriam-Webster’s Online Dictionary, 
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/potestative%20condition (accessed 2 May 2015). 




Luxembourg.28 As such the clause was held to be contrary to the objectives of Article 23 of 
the Brussels I Regulation. The effect of the decision is to destabilize a term frequently 
encountered in cross border commercial transactions. In future proceedings in EU Member 
States (including England) concerning asymmetric jurisdiction agreements, arguments based 
on the decision in Rothschild will inevitably be employed in an attempt to disable them. The 
effect is to generate uncertainty and expense, and to render a future preliminary reference 
to the CJEU under Article 267 TFEU more likely. 
On 25 March 2015, the French Supreme Court for Civil and Criminal matters (Cour de 
Cassation) upheld its decision in Rothschild and ruled that an asymmetrical jurisdiction 
clause is not be enforceable in France.29 The case concerned a French business and a Swiss 
bank. The clause provided that the bank could sue in ‘any other court of competent 
jurisdiction’. The lower court had validated the clause. The Cour de Cassation allowed the 
appeal and ruled that the clause could have been validated if it had made clear on which 
‘objective elements’ it granted jurisdiction, which the lower court did not discuss. The 
decision lacked a reference to the French contract law concept of potestative clauses. 
Contrary to Rothschild, the case concerned Article 23 of the Lugano Convention (2007) and 
both parties were commercial entities.30 
On 7 October 2015, the French Supreme Court (Cour de cassation) handed down a decision 
that has clarified its interpretation of the rules for jurisdiction clauses within the European 
Union.31 In this case, a company incorporated in France (eBizcuss) and a company 
incorporated in Ireland (Apple Sales International) had signed a contract with a jurisdiction 
clause whereby the parties agreed that disputes would be settled in the courts of the 
Republic of Ireland. However, the same clause also reserved the right of the Irish company 
alone to apply to the courts with jurisdiction over the counterparty's registered office, or 
those in any country where it suffered a loss caused by the counterparty. The French 
                                                          
28 See Article 1170 of the French Civil Code: ‘A potestative condition is one which makes the fulfilment of the 
agreement depend upon an event which one or the other of the contracting parties has the power to make 
happen or to prevent.’; Article 1174 of the French Civil Code: ‘An obligation is void where it was contracted 
subject to a potestative condition on the part of the one who binds himself.’  (Translated into English by 
Georges Rouhette, Professor of Law, with the assistance of Dr Anne Rouhette-Berton, Assistant 
Professor of English - www.legifrance.gouv.fr). 
29 ICH (Societe) v Credit Suisse (Societe) Cass civ, 1ere, 25.3.2015, No 13-27.264, [2015] ILPr 39; See M Ancel, 
Clause attributive de juridiction asymétrique – Clair-obscur sur les clauses d’élection de for asymétriques, Nº 
163 Banque & Droit, 4, septembre-octobre 2015; J Strnad, ICH (Societe) v Credit Suisse (Societe), 15 The 
European Legal Forum 72, 72-73 (2015); EB Crawford and JM Carruthers, International Private Law: A Scots 
Perspective, 168 (4th Edition, W Green 2015); G Cuniberti, French Supreme Court Confirms Rothschild, 
http://conflictoflaws.net/2015/french-supreme-court-confirms-rotschild/ (accessed 21 April 2015).  
30 Article 23 of the Convention on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and 
commercial matters OJ L 339/3, 21.12.2007, OJ 2009, L 147/5 (‘Lugano Convention’); See Official explanatory 
report on the Lugano Convention by Professor Fausto Pocar: OJ 2009, C 319/1. 
31 See Apple Sales International v eBizcuss Cass. 1ere Civ, 7.10.2015, No. 14-16.898; See Keyes and Marshall, 
Jurisdiction Agreements, supra, 371-372, discussing the Cour d’appel de Paris decision in Apple Sales 
International v eBizcuss (Cour d’appel, Paris, 08.04.2014, RG no 13/21121) which was upheld on appeal by the 
Cour de Cassation. 




company complained that the Irish company was infringing competition law, and started 
proceedings before the Paris Commercial Court seeking compensation for the harm it had 
suffered. The Irish company successfully argued that the Commercial Court lacked 
jurisdiction, which belonged to the courts of Ireland. When the French company's appeal to 
the Paris Court of Appeal was also unsuccessful, it filed a Supreme Court appeal. The Cour 
de cassation took the opportunity in this decision to refine its jurisprudence in Rothschild 
and ICH v Crédit Suisse by upholding asymmetric jurisdiction clauses provided that they 
objectively identify the courts that may have jurisdiction. In the view of the French Supreme 
Court even though the French and Irish companies did not enjoy the same freedom in 
choosing which court would hear their dispute, the jurisdiction clause did abide by the 
predictability requirement by making it possible to objectively identify which courts could 
conceivably have jurisdiction. It is submitted that the French Supreme Court is distancing 
itself from the requirement of strict mutuality of terms (potestative) by focusing on 
objective criteria that help identify the courts possessing jurisdiction. In this particular case, 
the option to sue in ‘any other court of competent jurisdiction’ frequently attributed to 
asymmetric jurisdiction agreements was replaced by a more predictable clause which 
provided a narrower range of readily ascertainable courts.      
The issue exposed in Rothschild and ICH v Crédit Suisse is whether, and if so in what 
circumstances, it is possible to advance an argument that asymmetric jurisdiction 
agreements are incompatible with what is now Article 25 of the Recast Regulation. Insofar 
as this is possible, the implications are serious and far-reaching. If such agreements are 
wholly ineffective and void neither party could rely on the agreement to found jurisdiction 
even in the primary non-exclusive court identified in the clause. Suppose that the parties to 
an international loan agreement confer jurisdiction on the English courts, but permit the 
lender to sue alternatively in any other court of competent jurisdiction. The borrower could 
now object even to proceedings brought by the lender in England. Again to challenge the 
validity of asymmetric jurisdiction agreements is to threaten a barrage of torpedo actions, in 
which counterparties, seeking to avoid a unilaterally exclusive jurisdiction agreement in 
favour of one court, commence pre-emptive proceedings elsewhere. Borrowers, 
contractually bound to litigate in England under English law, often seek to escape the pro-
creditor approach of the English courts when applying English law by seeking a declaration 
of non-liability in legal systems offering them greater protection. Such pre-emptive strikes 
are destined to fail if both contracting parties have bilaterally agreed to the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the English courts. But pre-emptive proceedings may become a feasible or 
even a viable option if the debtor has grounds to challenge the validity of asymmetric 
jurisdiction agreements. The French Supreme Court decisions have meant that the 
likelihood of pre-emptive proceedings being initiated in an attempt to impugn the validity of 
an asymmetric jurisdiction agreement conferring jurisdiction on the English courts has 
increased. However, the ruling in Apple Sales International v eBizcuss indicates a possible 
change in the French Supreme Court’s attitude towards such clauses and arguably reduces 




the ‘litigation risk’32 arising from pre-emptive proceedings challenging the validity of an 
English asymmetric jurisdiction agreement. Under the circumstances and in the context of 
the Recast Regulation, an action for damages for breach of the jurisdiction agreement may 
play a significant role in both effectively deterring the onset of these torpedo actions and in 
responding to the actual breach by compensating the aggrieved party in relation to the 
costs and expenses incurred in litigating in a torpedo forum.   
Effectiveness of Asymmetric Jurisdiction Agreements and Article 25 of the Recast 
Regulation 
At the outset it may be observed that asymmetric non-exclusive jurisdiction agreements are 
in principle compatible with Article 25 of the Brussels I Regulation (Recast).33 First, Article 25 
expressly provides that agreements within its scope are exclusive unless otherwise agreed, 
thereby recognizing that non-exclusive jurisdiction agreements are compatible with the 
Regulation.34 Secondly, the decisions in Rothschild and ICH v Crédit Suisse are inconsistent 
with the assumptions underlying Article 25.35 The choice of court agreement provision in the 
Brussels Convention expressly provided that:36 ‘If an agreement conferring jurisdiction was 
concluded for the benefit of only one of the parties, that party shall retain the right to bring 
proceedings in any other court which has jurisdiction by virtue of this Convention’. Those 
words were omitted from Article 23 of the Brussels I Regulation not because such 
agreements are objectionable, but because (it was generally assumed) the endorsement of 
                                                          
32 For a definition of ‘litigation risk’ arising from multistate transactions, see Fentiman, International 
Commercial Litigation, supra, 42. 
33 U Magnus, Article 25 in U Magnus and P Mankowski (eds.), Brussels Ibis Regulation, 659 (Köln, Verlag Dr 
Otto Schmidt 2016); Fentiman, International Commercial Litigation, supra, 81; F Garcimartin, Chapter 9 – 
Prorogation of Jurisdiction in Andrew Dickinson and Eva Lein (eds.), The Brussels I Regulation Recast 302 (OUP 
2015); TC Hartley, Choice of Court Agreements under the European and International Instruments, 141 (OUP 
2013); TC Hartley, International Commercial Litigation, 180-181 (2nd Edition, CUP 2015); A Layton and H Mercer 
(eds.), European Civil Practice, 706-707 (Volume I, 2nd Edition, Sweet & Maxwell 2004) (In relation to Article 23 
of the Brussels I Regulation); cf Crawford and Carruthers, supra, 168-169, note that the validity of asymmetric 
choice of court clauses is more ‘debatable’ and ‘contentious’ as compared to ‘harlequin’ jurisdiction clauses 
(e.g. Case 23/78 Meeth v Glacetal [1978] ECR 2133) which are still ‘permitted’.  
34 For example, see, Case 23/78 Meeth v Glacetal [1978] ECR 2133; See Article 25(1) of the Recast Regulation 
and Article 23(1) of the Brussels I Regulation; Layton and Mercer, supra, 706. 
35 Fentiman, Unilateral Jurisdiction Agreements in Europe, supra, 25-26. 
36 Article 17(4) of the 1968 Brussels Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and 
commercial matters OJ L 299, 31.12.1972, p 32. (‘Brussels Convention’); See Case C-22/85 Anterist v Credit 
Lyonnais [1986] ECR 1951 [14], underlying the need for a clear demonstration of the intention of the parties in 
favour of one of them; Layton and Mercer, supra, 741, lend support to an objective assessment of an 
asymmetric jurisdiction agreement and note that too wide an enquiry into the respective benefits of the 
agreement for each party is undesirable at the preliminary stage of deciding whether the court has jurisdiction 
and Article 17(4) of the Brussels Convention should be narrowly interpreted. In Soc. Edmond Coignet S.A. v 
Banca Commerciale Italia, French Cour de Cassation, 4 December 1990, [1992] ILPr 450, the court held that 
‘the common intention to confer an advantage on one of the parties must be clear either from the wording of 
the clause or from all the evidence to be found in the contract or from the circumstances in which it was 
concluded’; See also, Report on the Lugano Convention (2007), OJ 2009 C 3419/1, [106] which notes that 
‘there was no reason to restrict the parties’ freedom by prohibiting them from agreeing in the contract 
between them that a non-exclusive forum should be available in addition to the forum or forums objectively 
available under the Convention.’ 




non-exclusive jurisdiction in Article 23 made explicit reference to unilateral agreements 
unnecessary.37 
Apart from evidence of the recognition of non-exclusive jurisdiction agreements, it is 
proposed that the effectiveness of asymmetric jurisdiction agreements under Article 25 of 
the Recast Regulation should be examined from the perspectives of validity, certainty, form 
and fairness. The validity of unilateral jurisdiction agreements is perhaps uncontroversial as 
these agreements will be valid if valid under the law of the chosen court including its rules 
of private international law. However, it is to be observed whether such agreements comply 
with Article 25’s requirements of form, certainty and fairness. 
Validity 
The determination of the substantive validity of a jurisdiction agreement under Article 23 of 
the Brussels I Regulation is problematic. First, the question arises whether the requirements 
imposed by Article 23 are a sufficient guarantee of substantive validity.38 If the answer is in 
the negative then the issue arises whether and to what extent may the law of a national 
legal system be applied to determine the issue. The exact identity of the national law used 
to determine substantive validity raises its own challenges. 
At the outset, it may be argued that the compatibility of an asymmetric jurisdiction 
agreement with Article 25 of the Recast Regulation is not an issue of substantive validity but 
a question of the scope of an ‘agreement’ governed by an autonomous interpretation of 
Article 25 of the Recast Regulation. It is at least arguable that the potestative nature of a 
jurisdiction clause and the existence of objective criteria that helps identify the courts 
possessing jurisdiction may be characterized as issues of formal consent. The advantage of 
such a characterization would be that it automatically facilitates a pan-European solution to 
the issue of the compatibility of asymmetric jurisdiction agreements with Article 25 of the 
Recast Regulation. The choice of law hurdle including the burden of pleading and proving 
foreign substantive law, choice of law rules and rules on renvoi on the validity of such 
agreements in the lex fori prorogatum would be eliminated.39 However, there is a contrary 
indication in the Official Explanatory Report of the Hague Convention that most ‘consent’ 
questions are governed by the choice of law rules established to determine substantive 
validity and capacity.40 Beaumont has warned us about the perils in the argument that 
issues of ‘consent’ are governed by either ‘the law of the forum – including its choice of law 
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rules’41 or even the law of the chosen forum including its choice of law rules.42 It should be 
noted that in both the Recast Regulation and the Hague Convention, the general principle of 
consent applies independently of the law of any Member State or Contracting State and 
follows autonomously from the instrument itself.43   
Whether or not an autonomous interpretation of Article 25 is of relevance to the 
compatibility of asymmetric jurisdiction agreements with Article 25 of the Recast 
Regulation, it will be argued here that the effectiveness of asymmetric jurisdiction 
agreements may still be characterized as an issue of substantive validity. Article 25 of the 
Recast Regulation provides that an agreement is ineffective if null and void as to its 
substantive validity under the law of the Member State whose court are designated under 
the agreement.44 (lex fori prorogatum) Therefore, the effectiveness of asymmetric 
jurisdiction agreements in relation to their validity will depend on the law of the chosen 
forum, including its rules of private international law.45 In practice, depending on the legal 
system in question, validity will therefore depend on the local law of the forum or on the 
law applicable of the main contract. 
Where an agreement is valid as per the law of the agreed court, it will also be valid in the 
courts of another EU Member State. Article 25 stipulates that the law of the chosen court 
including its choice of law rules will govern substantive validity. Let’s suppose that a bank 
and a borrower agree to the jurisdiction of the English courts, in which such agreements are 
valid, but the bank is permitted to sue in addition in any other court of competent 
jurisdiction. The borrower brings proceedings in Italy contrary to the agreement. If the bank 
then sues in the English courts, it may be argued that the English courts are deemed to have 
sole responsibility under Article 31(2) of the Recast Regulation for determining the validity 
of the agreement.46 In the likely event that Article 31(2) is not engaged by the 
commencement of proceedings in England or the bank does not decide to sue in England at 
all, the Italian courts would still be obliged to refer the agreement’s material validity to 
English law under Article 25 of the Recast Regulation. Conversely, let’s suppose that the 
bank exercises its option to sue in any court of competent jurisdiction by initiating 
proceedings against the borrower in France. The borrower challenges the bank’s right to do 
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42 Beaumont, supra, 139. 
43 Hartley, Choice of Court Agreements under the European and International Instruments, supra, 133; 
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44 See Recital 20 and Article 25(1) of the Recast Regulation. 
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so by relying on the argument that such agreements are invalid in French law. The borrower 
may also argue that such agreements are by necessary implication also contrary to EU law. 
The challenge will fail because under Article 25 English law alone governs the material 
validity of a jurisdiction agreement. The underlying logic is that the parties have agreed 
(although for the bank’s sole benefit) to the non-exclusive jurisdiction of the English courts, 
making English law the law of the chosen court. Even if the bank opts to sue in France 
pursuant to the agreement, the jurisdiction of the French courts is not the agreed 
jurisdiction under Article 25 of the Recast Regulation. It will derive from whatever ground of 
personal or subject matter jurisdiction the bank relies on. There is no sense in which French 
law, as the law of the actual forum, is engaged. 
Asymmetric jurisdiction agreements will be invalid if the parties select as the primary court 
designated in the agreement a court in a Member State which imposes strict requirements 
of mutuality on contractual terms. English law will refer the issue of the substantive validity 
of a jurisdiction agreement to the law governing the host contract. As observed above, 
asymmetric jurisdiction agreements have been upheld without challenge or reservation in 
numerous English decisions. 
English law’s positive treatment of asymmetric jurisdiction agreements is premised on three 
underlying principles.47 First, such agreements are considered as imposing an obligation on 
beneficiaries and do not lack mutuality. The beneficiary is obliged to accept that the English 
courts have jurisdiction over any claim brought by the counterparty. Second, the principles 
of the freedom and sanctity of the contract are paramount in assessing the effect of such 
clauses.48 Even a clause requiring the borrower to accept the jurisdiction of any court in 
which the bank elects to sue would be valid. Third, Article 6 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (‘ECHR’) may not affect any restriction on a party’s choice of forum. It has 
been judicially pronounced that it ‘is directed to access to justice within the forum chosen 
by the parties, not to choice of forum’.49   
 
Certainty 
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A jurisdiction agreement under Article 25 must be certain in the sense that the agreed court 
or courts must be ascertainable.50 It may be argued that asymmetric jurisdiction agreements 
confer discretion on where one party might bring proceedings and hence undermine the 
legal certainty inherent in the Recast Regulation’s jurisdictional regime. However, Article 25 
itself recognises non-exclusive jurisdiction agreements and uncertainty as to venue are part 
and parcel of such agreements.51 Apart from the specific case of Article 25, the Recast 
Regulation clearly makes provision for allowing claimants a fettered or limited choice of 
venue or forum shopping.52 The special jurisdiction rules under Article 7 of the Recast 
Regulation are based on a connection between the subject matter of the dispute and the 
forum and are an alternative to personal jurisdiction under Article 4 of the Regulation. 
Let’s consider an asymmetric jurisdiction agreement providing that proceedings may be 
commenced in ‘any other court of competent jurisdiction’ from the perspective of certainty. 
It is submitted that determining the court of competent jurisdiction under the clear and 
precisely demarcated jurisdictional rules of the Recast Regulation is not an onerous task and 
does not lead to wanton uncertainty. Under the Recast Regulation, the parties to the 
asymmetric jurisdiction agreement will be in a position to predict with reasonable clarity 
and certainty where they may sue and where they may be sued, thereby eliminating the 
element of uncertainty. 
Form 
It might be suggested that asymmetric jurisdiction agreements are incompatible with the 
requirements as to form of Article 25 of the Recast Regulation. First, the objection to 
asymmetric jurisdiction agreements may be said to lie in their unilateral form, whereby one 
party assumes obligations regarding jurisdiction, while the other does not. This line of 
reasoning fails on two distinct grounds. On the one hand it mistakes the nature of such 
agreements. While they are clearly asymmetric, by giving one party alone the right to sue 
other than in the designated court, they are not truly unilateral in nature. Far from imposing 
no obligation on the beneficiary under the agreement, such agreements oblige that party to 
accept the jurisdiction of the designated court if sued there by the counterparty.53 Even if, 
as is common, such agreements are expressed to be for the benefit of one party, this does 
not entitle that party to renounce its agreement to proceedings in the designated court.54 
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More significantly, whatever the nature of such agreements, there is nothing in the Recast 
Regulation or its objectives to suggest that any asymmetry or lack of mutuality is an 
objection to their effectiveness. Indeed, Article 25’s language clearly suggests that such 
concerns about form are irrelevant. Article 25 expressly demands that jurisdiction 
agreements be in writing, or otherwise in a form evident to the parties, but says nothing 
more about their permitted structure. Any wider objections to the type of jurisdiction 
agreements which are permissible arguably belong to the law of contract, not to the law of 
jurisdiction, and are irrelevant to whether a given clause is compatible with Article 25.55 
Second, it might be suggested that hybrid jurisdiction agreements are incompatible with 
Article 25, because the Recast Regulation governs only agreements to the jurisdiction of one 
Member State, being limited to agreements to submit to the court or courts of that Member 
State. This is misconceived for two reasons. There is no reason why the parties cannot agree 
to the jurisdiction of the courts of more than one Member State. More importantly, such an 
agreement misunderstands the nature of a typical asymmetric clause. Such clauses do not 
purport to confer jurisdiction on the courts of more than one Member State. The only 
jurisdiction agreement contained in such a clause is the agreement to the jurisdiction of the 
designated court. Whether any court has jurisdiction depends not on agreement, but on 
whether any other court is otherwise competent, by reason of the defendant’s domicile, or 
because it has subject matter jurisdiction under Article 7. The language of the former Article 
17(4) of the Brussels Convention is instructive here.56 It provided that where: ‘an agreement 
conferring jurisdiction was concluded for the benefit of only one of the parties, that party 
shall retain the right to bring proceedings in any other court which has jurisdiction by virtue 
of this Convention’. 
Third, it may be said that only an agreement which excludes the possibility of proceedings in 
more than one Member State is exclusive. An asymmetric agreement is therefore inevitably 
non-exclusive. Although no such definition is provided by the Regulation, exclusive 
jurisdiction agreements are thus defined by the Hague Convention:57 The parties agree to 
‘the courts of one Contracting State or one or more specific courts of one Contracting State 
to the exclusion of the jurisdiction of any other courts’. In the context of the Hague 
Convention this narrow definition serves its purpose as only exclusive jurisdiction 
agreements are regulated by the Convention. In the context of the Regulation, however, the 
effect of regarding asymmetric agreements as non-exclusive is potentially problematic. 
There is nothing incoherent about concluding that such agreements are non-exclusive for 
the purposes of Article 31(2), but intractable problems arise in the context of Article 25. 
Such a conclusion is inconsistent with a counterparty’s clear agreement that it will sue 
exclusively in the designated court, and it cannot have been intended to deny such an 
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agreement exclusive effect should a counterparty sue in another court in breach of the 
agreement. 
Arguably, the solution is to draw a distinction between a jurisdiction clause and the distinct 
agreements it may compromise. It is coherent to say that asymmetric clauses are to be 
classified as non-exclusive, insofar as they do not confine proceedings to a single court. 
However, such clauses contain separate exclusive and non-exclusive jurisdiction 
agreements, whereby the counterparty’s agreement to sue in the designated court is 
exclusive, and the beneficiary’s agreement to sue in that court is non-exclusive. 
Fourth, it may be argued that Article 25 allows for the possibility that a jurisdiction 
agreement may be either exclusive or non-exclusive, but not both. Certainly, Article 25 
describes these as alternatives, but again, it is important to distinguish jurisdiction clauses, 
in the sense of terms or paragraphs in a contract, from jurisdiction agreements, being the 
legal binding promises contained in such clauses. A jurisdiction agreement cannot logically 
be both exclusive and non-exclusive simultaneously, but a single clause may incorporate 
distinct agreements on both types. 
Fairness 
It may be suggested that asymmetric jurisdiction agreements are incompatible with the 
principle of equal access to justice enshrined in Article 6 of the ECHR.58 This argument 
supplies a means for challenging such provisions for lack of mutuality otherwise lacking in 
the letter and spirit of the Brussels I Regulation, but it fails to convince. First, the 
requirement of equal access to justice cannot realistically be applied in a manner in which 
each party is actually placed on an equal footing in litigation. Such an altruistic supposition is 
necessarily divorced from the complex realities of high value international commercial 
litigation where equality of arms is at best an illusion. Second, it is difficult to countenance 
why a freely entered into contractual agreement, in the absence of malice or bad faith by 
the other party, could be regarded as infringing a party’s rights. In a different but related 
context it appears that a party which has agreed to the exclusive jurisdiction of the English 
courts cannot complain that its Article 6 ECHR rights are infringed if an English court grants 
an injunction to prevent it from suing elsewhere.59 Even if Article 6 ECHR engages in the 
present context, it is doubtful that it can be concerned with the extent of a party’s choice of 
jurisdiction. As has been said: 
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Article 6 of the ECHR does not deal at all with where the right to a fair and public 
hearing before an independent and impartial tribunal established by law is to be 
exercised by a litigant. The crucial point is that civil rights must be determined 
somewhere by a hearing and before a tribunal in accordance with the provisions of 
Article 6.60 
As this implies, the principle of equality of arms enshrined in Article 6 ECHR is concerned 
with the position of the parties before a particular court, not whether the parties have an 
equal choice of court prior to selecting a forum to litigate in.61 It is possible that some 
involuntary restriction on a party’s right to litigate, such as an anti-suit injunction which 
denies a claimant the opportunity to sue anywhere, might infringe the requirement of 
access to justice.62 The principle would also be infringed if the effect of limiting a party’s 
choice of forum is to force them into a court where they would not receive substantial 
justice,63 but in such cases it is not any lack of equality in the choice of forum which is the 
source of the injustice. The source of injustice is rather the determination of the party’s civil 
rights and obligations in a court which denies them a fair, just and impartial hearing 
resulting in a miscarriage of justice. 
Interim Conclusions 
Building on the arguments above, principle suggests that unilateral or asymmetric non-
exclusive jurisdiction agreements are compatible with Article 25 of the Recast Regulation. 
These are agreements whereby the parties agree to the jurisdiction of a given court, but one 
party alone has the right to sue in any other court of competent jurisdiction. Thus, one party 
submits to the exclusive jurisdiction of a given court, whereas the other party submits to 
that court’s non-exclusive jurisdiction. Such provisions are a type of non-exclusive 
jurisdiction agreement, which are expressly permitted by Article 25.  
Notwithstanding any arguments regarding the compatibility of an asymmetric non-exclusive 
jurisdiction agreement with Article 25, the potential for torpedo actions impugning the 
validity of such agreements in the wake of Rothschild and ICH v Crédit Suisse cannot be ruled 
out. However, the ruling in Apple Sales International v eBizcuss indicates a possible change 
in the French Supreme Court’s attitude towards such clauses and arguably reduces the 
litigation risk arising from pre-emptive proceedings challenging the validity of an English 
asymmetric jurisdiction agreement. Whether any subsequent proceedings in the English 
courts will trigger Article 31(2) of the Recast Regulation is uncertain at the moment. 
However, it has been argued that the borrower in an international finance agreement is 
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obliged to litigate in the primary forum and thus the jurisdiction agreement is exclusive in a 
sense. Hence, proceedings in the primary forum in response to the commencement of a 
torpedo action by the borrower should in principle be able to rely on Article 31(2).64 In the 
event that Article 31(2) cannot be invoked or even otherwise, seeking damages for breach 
of the asymmetric jurisdiction agreement in the English courts may compensate the 
aggrieved party.65 Thus, the common law’s pragmatic damages remedy may be revitalized 
by augmenting the procedural mechanisms for the enforcement of jurisdiction agreements 
in the Recast Regulation.    
From a systemic perspective, a future reference to the CJEU concerning the validity of such 
agreements may help clarify the waters muddied by the decisions of the Cour de Cassation 
in Rothschild and ICH v Crédit Suisse.66 A positive development which may ameliorate the 
litigation risk created by the rulings in Rothschild and ICH v Credit Suisse is the incorporation 
of a new choice of law rule in Article 25 of the Recast Regulation which refers the 
substantive validity of a jurisdiction agreement to the law of the selected forum including its 
private international law rules. This will mean that the courts of any Member State seised 
with a dispute will refer the substantive validity of an asymmetric jurisdiction agreement to 
the law of the selected forum and that such agreements shall be valid, if valid under the lex 
fori prorogatum. The argument that the compatibility of asymmetric jurisdiction agreements 
with Article 25 is an issue of the scope of an ‘agreement’ governed by an autonomous 
interpretation of Article 25 of the Recast Regulation has also been explored. A clarification 
of the position by a CJEU decision would be most welcome.   
Effectiveness of Asymmetric Jurisdiction Agreements and Article 23 of the Brussels I 
Regulation 
Jurisdiction agreements in disputes commenced before 10 January 2015 are subject to 
Article 23 of the Brussels I Regulation, if one party is domiciled in an EU Member State. The 
effect of asymmetric jurisdiction agreements is in principle the same as under Article 25 of 
the Recast Regulation, with the important exception that Article 23 makes no explicit 
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reference to the law governing the substantive validity of jurisdiction agreements. The law 
governing the substantive validity of a jurisdiction agreement is therefore a controversial 
issue under the Brussels I Regulation.67 
It is possible that the conditions of validity stipulated by Article 23 are complete and that a 
jurisdiction agreement is enforceable merely if the requirements of consensus, form and 
certainty are satisfied. The alternative is that substantive validity of such an agreement is 
within the remit of national law, with the effect that the law governing the agreement 
regulates such matters as the vitiation of consent by reason of fraud, duress or mistake. The 
English courts have accepted that no reference to national law is possible.68 However, this 
view is not the norm elsewhere69 and the opposite view has been adopted in some EU 
Member States.70 Some Member States apply the law of the forum and others the law 
governing the contract.71 
If Article 23 is an autonomous regime, not subject to national law, the issue of substantive 
validity becomes irrelevant and leaves asymmetric agreements to be decided by reference 
to considerations of form, certainty and fairness. Insofar as substantive validity is subject to 
national law, their validity is a matter for that law, exposing such agreements to the risk of 
invalidity depending on the content of that law. Such agreements would be valid, therefore, 
in an English court, in a contract governed by English law.  
Effectiveness of Asymmetric Jurisdiction Agreements Subject to National Law 
Under Article 23 of the Brussels I Regulation, national law governs the prorogative effect of 
agreements to the jurisdiction of EU Member State courts, neither party to which is EU 
domiciled.72 However, Article 23 precludes any Member State court but the designated 
court from exercising jurisdiction unless the designated court has itself declined 
jurisdiction.73 The effect is that an English court will apply the doctrine of the ‘proper law’ of 
the contract to determine the validity and effect of an asymmetric jurisdiction agreement 
where England is the primary forum and both parties are non EU domicillaries.74 Such an 
agreement would be valid if it is valid according to the proper law of the choice of court 
                                                          
67 B Hess, T Pfeiffer and P Schlosser, The Brussels I Regulation 44/2001: Application and Enforcement in the EU 
91-92 (München, Verlag CH Beck 2008). (‘Heidelberg Report’) 
68 Aeroflot v Berezovsky [2013] EWCA Civ 784, [65]. 
69 U Magnus, Article 23 in U Magnus and P Mankowski (eds.), Brussels I Regulation, 477 (2nd Edition, Sellier 
2012), citing a number of German authorities.  
70 Heidelberg Report, supra, 92. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Article 23(1) of the Brussels I Regulation. 
73 Article 23(3) of the Brussels I Regulation; The derogative effect of a jurisdiction agreement selecting the 
courts of a Member State concluded by non EU domiciliaries is regulated by the Brussels I Regulation.   
74 Choice of court agreements are excluded from the scope of the Rome I Regulation; See Article 1(2)(e) of 
Regulation No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable 
to contractual obligations (Rome I) OJ L/2008/177/6. 




agreement, which is quite often the applicable law of the substantive contract.75 As a result, 
the asymmetric jurisdiction agreement should be valid if the lex causae of the substantive 
contract is English law.  
Asymmetric Jurisdiction Agreements, Article 31(2) of the Recast Regulation and the 
Damages Remedy for Breach of Choice of Court Agreements  
The Brussels I Regulation (Recast) aims to augment jurisdictional party autonomy in the EU 
by means of an overriding ‘reverse lis pendens rule’76 which accords priority to proceedings 
in the court chosen in an exclusive choice of court agreement and requires any other 
Member State court seised to stay proceedings and ultimately decline jurisdiction.77 
However, Article 31(2) of the Recast Regulation applies only to exclusive jurisdiction 
agreements and does not apply where the parties seek to confer non-exclusive jurisdiction 
on the courts of a Member State.78 Significantly in practice, this may have the effect that an 
asymmetric jurisdiction agreement, of the type frequently encountered in cross border 
finance transactions, is not caught by Article 31(2). If such agreements are not protected by 
Article 31(2), there remains the potential for a party to an asymmetric jurisdiction 
agreement to disable the agreement by launching a pre-emptive strike in its preferred 
court. Suppose that A and B agree to the jurisdiction of the English courts. A alone has the 
right to sue in any other court of competent jurisdiction. B must sue exclusively in England. 
B launches a pre-emptive strike in France and A replies by suing in England. The question is 
whether Article 31(2) is engaged or does Gasser and the court first seised rule still prevent A 
from relying on the agreement.79 
In principle, such hybrid agreements are exclusive against a counterparty, but non-exclusive 
for the benefit of the beneficiary under the clause. This suggests that Article 31(2) should 
engage if the counterparty brings proceedings other than in the designated court in breach 
of its promise to sue only in that court,80 but whether such hybrid agreements are subject to 
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tactics that had acquired notoriety under Article 27 of the Brussels I Regulation.      
80 An asymmetric jurisdiction agreement has been held to be exclusive for the borrower in an international 
loan agreement by the English Court of Appeal in a leading case governed by the Brussels Convention: 
Continental Bank NA v Aeakos Compania Naviera SA [1994] 1 WLR 588, 592F-594G (CA) (Steyn LJ); Mauritius 




Article 31(2) is problematic.81 An elementary difficulty, going beyond the effect of Article 
31(2), is that such hybrid clauses may be ineffective and invalid under the Regulation.82 If 
such agreements are in principle compatible with the Regulation, their status under Article 
31(2) depends on how the matter is characterized. Arguably, the nature of the agreement is 
a matter concerning the interpretation of the clause, and therefore a matter for the national 
law of the forum.83 Therefore, the effect of such a clause would vary and depend on which 
law the forum applies to that question.84 An asymmetric jurisdiction agreement might not 
be regarded as exclusive against a counterparty in some legal systems, perhaps because 
under the law governing the agreement only mutually exclusive agreements are regarded as 
exclusive. However, such an agreement would be regarded as exclusive against a 
counterparty where the law governing the contract is English law.85 Therefore, Article 31(2) 
would apply as the agreement would be treated as an exclusive jurisdiction agreement and 
the provision would prevent a counterparty from suing in a forum other than the designated 
court. 
Notwithstanding any arguments premised on preserving the practice of the English courts in 
relation to asymmetric jurisdiction agreements, it has been argued that the language of 
Article 31(2) (construed in association with Recital 22) limits its application to those 
agreements which confer exclusive jurisdiction simpliciter.86  The definition of an exclusive 
choice of court agreement in Article 3(a) of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court 
Agreements may serve as a guide considering the fact that the Convention is in force in all 
the Member States of the EU (except Denmark):87  
“exclusive choice of court agreement” means an agreement concluded by two or 
more parties that meets the requirements of paragraph c) and designates, for the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Commercial Bank Limited v Hestia Holdings Limited and Sujana Universal Industries Limited [2013] EWHC 1328 
(Comm) (Popplewell J). 
81 Fentiman, International Commercial Litigation, supra, 101; F Garcimartin, Chapter 11 – Article 31(2)-(4) in 
Andrew Dickinson and Eva Lein (eds.), The Brussels I Regulation Recast, 341 (OUP 2015); Bergson, The Death of 
the Torpedo Action?, supra, 22. 
82 Two significant French Supreme Court decisions have invalidated asymmetric jurisdiction agreements under 
Article 23 of the Brussels I Regulation and Article 23 of the Lugano Convention respectively: See Ms X v Banque 
Privee Edmond de Rothschild Europe (Societe) Cass civ, 1ere, 26.9.2012, No 11-26.022, [2013] ILPr 12; ICH 
(Societe) v Credit Suisse (Societe) Cass civ, 1ere, 25.3.2015, No 13-27.264, [2015] ILPr 39; cf In Apple Sales 
International v eBizcuss Cass. 1ere Civ, 7.10.2015, No. 14-16.898, the French Supreme Court has validated an 
asymmetric jurisdiction agreement under Article 23 of the Brussels I Regulation because the courts possessing 
jurisdiction were objectively identifiable; The CJEU’s position on this matter is unclear and the Recast 
Regulation has not endeavoured to clarify the status of these clauses in the EU law of international civil 
procedure.  
83 Case C-214/89 Powell Duffryn plc v Wolfgang Peterit [1992] ECR I-1745 [35]-[36]; Layton and Mercer, supra, 
706. 
84 See R Fentiman, Article 31 in U Magnus and P Mankowski (eds.), Brussels Ibis Regulation, 753 (Köln, Verlag 
Dr Otto Schmidt 2016).  
85 An English court would determine the effect of the agreement by reference to the ‘proper law’ of the choice 
of court agreement which is usually the applicable law of the host (substantive) contract. See FN 75 above. 
86 See Magnus, Gerichtsstandsvereinbarungen unter der reformierten EuGVO, supra, 799; Neilson, supra, 521. 
87 Emphasis added. 




purpose of deciding disputes which have arisen or may arise in connection with a 
particular legal relationship, the courts of one Contracting State or one or more 
specific courts of one Contracting State to the exclusion of the jurisdiction of any 
other courts 
Therefore, under an autonomous interpretation of exclusive jurisdiction agreements only 
mutually exclusive jurisdiction agreements would benefit from the exception to the general 
rule on lis pendens.88  
If it is determined that asymmetric jurisdiction agreements fall outside the protective cover 
of Article 31(2) and pre-emptive proceedings are commenced by the borrower in breach of 
his obligation to sue exclusively in the English courts, an action in damages for breach of 
contract may both act as an effective deterrent and respond to the actual breach by 
compensating the aggrieved financial institution in relation to the costs and expenses of 
litigating in the foreign forum.89 On the other hand, even if asymmetric jurisdiction 
agreements are deemed to be exclusive jurisdiction agreements for the purposes of Article 
31(2), the aggrieved party may nevertheless elect not to commence protective proceedings 
in the contractual forum and instead rely on the damages remedy to compensate for the 
breach of the choice of court agreement.90 However, it should be noted that the availability 
of damages in the latter case is speculative and might not be permitted by the CJEU because 
the party relying on the jurisdiction agreement has failed to take advantage of the systemic 
solution provided by the Recast Regulation of seising the chosen court before the court first 
seised has adjudicated on the applicability and validity of the jurisdiction agreement. 
Conclusions 
The decisions of the French Cour de Cassation in the Rothschild and ICH v Crédit Suisse cases 
have effectively increased both the venue and enforcement risk arising from asymmetric 
jurisdiction agreements in the EU.91 However, the ruling in Apple Sales International v 
Ebizcuss indicates a possible change in the attitude of the French Supreme Court towards 
such clauses as the judicial reasoning in this latter decision was focused on the requirement 
of predictability rather than the potestative nature of the clause requiring a strict mutuality 
of terms. Nonetheless, the certainty and predictability fostered by a dispute resolution 
agreement frequently encountered in international finance agreements has been 
undermined. Moreover, the incidence of torpedo actions challenging the validity and 
effectiveness of asymmetric jurisdiction agreements may have been implicitly encouraged. 
                                                          
88 Garcimartin, Chapter 11 – Article 31(2)-(4), supra, 341. 
89 See Starlight Shipping Co v Allianz Marine & Aviation Versicherungs AG (The Alexandros T) [2014] EWCA Civ 
1010, [15]-[17] (Longmore LJ). 
90 Fentiman, International Commercial Litigation, supra, 98, suggests that the option of invoking the protective 
cover of Article 31(2) may be substituted by the secondary enforcement of choice of court agreements via the 
damages remedy. However, he notes that the availability of damages in such cases is ‘problematic’. 
91 Ibid 6-7: ‘Venue risk’ is a species of ‘litigation risk’ which arises when a party is required to initiate or defend 
proceedings in an unfavourable forum; See FN 23 above for a definition of ‘enforcement risk’. 




The potential for challenges to the validity of such agreements are made even more enticing 
by a literal reading of Article 31(2) of the Recast Regulation which excludes from its scope 
non-exclusive jurisdiction agreements including presumably the obligation that binds one 
party to the asymmetric agreement to sue exclusively in England. These observations 
suggest that agreements which differ from the standard model of an exclusive jurisdiction 
agreement should be used with caution in practice.92 From the perspective of the ready 
availability of cost effective finance, any decision which undermines a creditor’s ability to 
enforce its rights threatens to increase the price of finance, so prejudicing those debtors 
whose interests the Cour de cassation apparently sought to protect.93 
However, it has been argued that asymmetric jurisdiction agreements are in principle 
effective under Article 25 of the Recast Regulation from the perspectives of validity, 
certainty, form and fairness. The referral of issues of substantive validity to the law of the 
chosen forum including its private international law rules will mean that an impugned 
English choice of court agreement before the English courts will be valid as such agreements 
are held to be valid under English law. The incorporation of a choice of law rule governing 
material validity in Article 25 will mean that the substantive validity of an English 
asymmetric choice of court agreement before the courts of another EU Member State will 
also be subject to English law. As a result, the negative repercussions of the French Cour de 
Cassation’s rulings in the Rothschild and ICH v Crédit Suisse cases should hopefully be 
ameliorated by Article 25 of the Recast Regulation. The argument that the compatibility of 
asymmetric jurisdiction agreements with Article 25 is an issue of the scope of an 
‘agreement’ governed by an autonomous interpretation of the choice of court agreement 
provision also leads to the conclusion that such clauses are reconcilable with Article 25. 
The interpretative extension of the protective cover of Article 31(2) of the Recast Regulation 
to asymmetric jurisdiction agreements may mean that proceedings in the English courts will 
trigger a stay of proceedings in a court seised in another EU Member State. However, in the 
more likely event that Article 31(2) is limited to mutually exclusive jurisdiction agreements 
and torpedo proceedings have been commenced in the courts of another EU Member State 
to impugn the validity of the English asymmetric jurisdiction agreement, it is still possible to 
claim damages for breach of the English choice of court agreement and recover the costs 
and expenses of litigating in the foreign forum. Notwithstanding the inapplicability of Article 
31(2) of the Recast Regulation, the new choice of law rule referring issues of material 
validity to the lex fori prorogatum should also help reduce venue risk by obliging the 
Member State court seised to channel the determination of the substantive validity of the 
                                                          
92 The Loan Market Association issued a memo in January 2013 warning of the risks now associated with the 
use of one-way jurisdiction clauses in lending documentation, and advised its members of alternative 
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jurisdiction clauses in LMA facility documentation’ (January 24, 2013). 
93 Fentiman, Unilateral Jurisdiction Agreements in Europe, supra, 27. 




English asymmetric choice of court agreement to English law which clearly recognizes such 
agreements. 
In the course of this article, the pragmatic approach of the English courts focused on the 
enforcement of the obligations undertaken by the contracting parties in an asymmetric 
jurisdiction agreement has been preferred to the French methodology which has favoured a 
strict mutuality of terms in a contract. Ultimately, we are dealing with a clash of underlying 
legal ideologies where an emphasis on the facilitation of the creditor and business efficacy 
has to be balanced with questions over the legitimacy of consent and concerns about 
unequal bargaining power.94 The line drawn by a legal system on this ideological scale will 
vary but the English legal system’s underlying emphasis on the freedom and sanctity of 
contract has confirmed its position as an enforcer of the rights and obligations of the parties 
to the asymmetric jurisdiction agreement. The decision in Apple Sales International v 
Ebizcuss demonstrates that the French Cour de cassation may be changing course by 
jettisoning the requirement of strict mutuality of terms (potestative) and replacing it with an 
objective assessment of the criteria identifying the courts possessing jurisdiction. 
 
 
     
                                                          
94 JN Adams and R Brownsword, The Ideologies of Contract, 7 Legal Studies 205 (1987), seek to provide an 
interpretative framework where the ideologies of ‘Market Individualism’ and ‘Consumer Welfarism’ inform 
contract law. A strict requirement of mutuality in contractual terms and the invalidity of potestative clauses 
may be considered to be examples of a stronger consumer welfarist strand in French contract law. On the 
other hand, the pragmatic and pro-enforcement approach of the English courts may be best reconciled by 
reference to the ideology of market individualism.     
